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Yes, consider consideration.  Should we weave webs with it to sharpen our 
students’ legal analyses or demystify it by letting them know up front that it’s 
really very easy and rarely matters in practice?  There are dangers with each 
approach: generations of law students have been made to feel stupid in 
contracts class only to ask later, like Peggy Lee, “Is that all there is?”  Yet 
“demystification,” a word popularized by the late Critical Legal Studies 
Movement,1 often makes the students think a topic is unimportant.  Now 
consideration is unimportant in many respects, but at the same time, it is very 
important—it makes us ask why we enforce promises.  This paradox is part of 
what we have to teach, yet again, it runs the danger of making the topic too 
mystical, a secret of the Holy Order of Contracts Teachers. 
I’d like to define consideration as the quality that makes the legal system 
decide to enforce a promise.  But that definition won’t do, at least not as the 
term is currently used in American courts.  It is a pretty good definition of the 
civil law’s causa or cause,2 but consideration as we use it does not include 
 
* Law Foundation Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.  The title of this paper 
was suggested by Rhea Stevens, Esq., of the Texas Bar. 
 1. The Crits were famous for their jargon, which ranged from slang like “trashing” to 
trendy literary terms like “deconstruction.”  (In fact, these last two are synonymous.  See Mark G. 
Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984).)  My all-time favorite CLS term is 
“counterhegemonic dereification.”  On this, see Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A 
Historical Perspective, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1373, 1388 (1984). 
 2. See FRENCH C. CIV. arts. 1131-33.  The Cour de cassation, the highest court in France, 
said nearly 140 years ago that “a natural obligation, even of conscience, can become the cause of 
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concepts like reliance and benefits previously conferred, which are said to 
create “contracts without consideration.”3  Consideration, at least the classical 
consideration that most of us start with, is a narrower and rather formalized 
concept that seems to exist mostly to be set up and knocked down again.4  
What we are talking about when we speak of “consideration” is the familiar 
Restatement version, something that is “bargained for” and “given in 
exchange” for a counter-act or promise,5 a simple enough concept that seems 
to give everyone a lot of trouble. 
One of the problems in teaching the bargain theory of consideration is the 
case often used as the jumping-off point, Hamer v. Sidway.6  Hamer is a 
wonderful case, with delectable flavor of 130 years ago: in 1869 William E. 
Story gets up at his parents’ golden anniversary party and tells his fifteen-year-
old nephew that if “Willie” will “refrain from drinking, using tobacco, 
swearing or playing cards or billiards for money”7 until his twenty-first 
birthday, Uncle will give him $5000 (a huge amount, of course, in those days).  
Willie “assent[s] thereto, and fully perform[s].”8  In 1875 he informs Uncle 
Story, who tells him, in an engaging letter, that he will hold the money for him.  
Uncle tells how “[t]he first five thousand dollars that I got together cost me a 
heap of hard work . . . . I shoved a jackplane many a day, butchered three or 
four years . . . . I was here in the cholera season ‘49 and ‘52 and the deaths 
averaged 80 to 125 daily . . . .  [I wanted] to go home, but Mr. Fisk, the 
gentleman I was working for, told me if I left them, after it got healthy he 
probably would not want me.  I stayed . . . .”9  Uncle Story continues by telling 
Willie that at Willie’s birth twenty-one years earlier, he bought him twenty 
sheep, which Willie’s father and grandfather were supposed to look after until 
Willie was of age.  Uncle Story estimates that there should be 500 to 600 by 
 
a civil obligation.”  (“Une obligation naturelle, même de conscience, peut devenir la cause d’une 
obligation civile.”)  DALLOZ, RECUEIL PÉRIODIQUE ET CRITIQUE MENSUEL, Pt 1, 208 (1862).  
The clearest explanation of cause that I have found is in ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN AND JAMES R. 
GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 913-14 (2d ed. 1977). 
 3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 82-90 (1981). 
 4. Given the ideological swing to the right, even in private law matters in state courts, there 
is a good case to be made that like a Joe Palooka doll, classical consideration has bounced up 
again and is daring us to keep it down for good. 
 5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981): 
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained 
for. 
(2) (2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor 
in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that 
promise . . . . 
 6. 27 N. E. 256 (1891). 
 7. Id. at 256. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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now,10 but we never learn what happened to them—they are the contracts 
equivalent of the giant rat of Sumatra.11  In the end, he warns Willie not to 
squander the money.  Uncle Story eventually dies, and his estate is sued, not by 
Willie, but by someone who has taken by “mesne assignments.”  (Some, but 
not all casebooks tell us that just as Uncle Story feared, Willie had become 
bankrupt; he and his father had failed in business.  Whether profligacy also 
played a role is not clear, but either Willie’s wife or his creditors were the ones 
trying to enforce the promise.  There is also more than a suggestion in the 
lower court opinion that Willie committed bankruptcy fraud or other 
questionable conduct.12) 
Up to this point, the students have an entertaining fact situation, but no 
law.  Now they get two points of law, one useful, the other very misleading.  
The useful point is that a legal detriment need not be a harm.  The estate tries 
to argue that Willie benefited from his path of virtue and thus gave no 
consideration for Uncle’s promise, but the court explains that not doing 
something that you have the legal right (or privilege) to do is a legal detriment, 
even if it is good for your health or soul.  That is of some value, and actually 
operates as a good illustration of Hohfeldian Analysis, to which I introduce the 
class when I teach offer and acceptance.13  In Hohfeldian terms, since Willie 
had no legal duty to refrain from drinking, smoking, swearing, playing cards 
and shooting pool (the juvenile laws apparently being pretty loose in those 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. “‘Matilda Briggs was not the name of a young woman, Watson,’ said Holmes in a 
reminiscent voice.  ‘It was a ship which is associated with the giant rat of Sumatra, a story for 
which the world is not yet prepared.’”  The Adventure of the Sussex Vampire,  2 SIR ARTHUR 
CONAN DOYLE, THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 1033-34 (Doubleday & Co. ed., 1930) 
(1927).  Finding this citation lured me into rereading Holmes, which itself made writing this 
article profitable. 
 12. The General Term’s opinion, 11 N.Y.S. 182 (1890), which was reversed by the Court of 
Appeals, is set out and discussed in an engaging note, Relational Background: Other Dealings 
Between Willie and His Uncle, in Professor Randy Barnett’s casebook, RANDY BARNETT, 
CONTRACTS 663 (2d ed. 1999). 
 13. Wesley Hohfeld, a brilliant but impenetrable legal philosopher who died young in 1918, 
put together a system of two groups of four terms (right-duty, privilege-no right; and power-
liability, disability-immunity) that I find valuable in teaching basic contract law.  Hohfeld’s actual 
writings are difficult, but Arthur Corbin, an early backer, wrote a lucid explanation that I give out 
to students.  See Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919).  
Corbin had relied heavily on Hohfeld in his equally classic article, Offer and Acceptance, and 
Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169 (1917), reprinted in PETER LINZER, A 
CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 273 (2d ed. 1995) (hereinafter “LINZER, CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY”).  
(Since I use my book when I teach the course, I have an excuse to plug it here.)  I have a short 
note on Hohfeldian terminology immediately preceding the Corbin reprint, see Wesley Hohfeld, 
Arthur Corbin and Precise Legal Terminology, id. at 271. (hereinafter “Linzer Note”). 
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days), his giving up of his “privilege” or imposing a duty upon himself was 
enough to bind the contract.14 
So far, so good.  But here comes the kicker.  Hamer isn’t a classic 
consideration case at all.  It doesn’t use the bargain theory, but an older theory 
called benefit-detriment.  While that system is apparently still the law in New 
York State,15 it was going out of style generally even in the 1890s when Hamer 
was written.  It confuses some students, at least those who, in Jane Austen’s 
words, are no conjurers;16 they figure (with some justice) that the lead case on 
consideration ought to tell them what consideration is.  Instead, they learn what 
it was, and was about 150 years ago, at that.17  I love Hamer, but I can’t tell 
you how demoralizing it is to read an exam discussing a twenty-first century 
contracts problem in terms of benefit and detriment. 
I wouldn’t for a minute get rid of Hamer, but I think we’ve got to be a lot 
more precise than most of us are in teaching it.  The real problem is that most 
of us don’t have the faintest idea how benefit-detriment differs from the 
bargain theory, and the reason for this is that Hamer is, in fact, a perfect 
bargain case!  It’s exactly like the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical18 that we all 
use to explain unilateral contracts: Uncle says, “If you won’t smoke ‘til you’re 
twenty-one I’ll give you $5000,” and Willie accepts through full performance, 
which was bargained for by the Uncle and given by Willie in exchange for 
Uncle’s promise.19  Thus, Hamer would be a fine illustration of bargain theory, 
but it doesn’t mention bargain.  Even bright students probably need this to be 
pointed out, and the non-bright can hardly be faulted for not getting the 
difference.  Talk about mystification. 
 
 14. In a nutshell, according to Hohfeld, a duty is something that the legal system will enforce 
through force if necessary, while a privilege is the absence of duty.  See Corbin, Legal Analysis 
and Terminology, supra note 13, at 167-68; Linzer Note, supra note 13, passim. 
 15. See Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 444-45 (N.Y. 1982) (applying the 
benefit-detriment rule to an employment dispute involving a personnel manual, and citing 
Hamer).  While Weiner’s impact as an employment law case has been limited by later cases, see, 
e.g., Sabetay v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1987); Skelly v. Visiting Nurse Ass’n, 
619 N.Y.S.2d 879 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), there is no indication that the benefit-detriment rule 
has been abandoned in New York State. 
 16. “Well, and so this was kept a great secret, for fear of Mrs. Ferrars . . . –til this very 
morning, poor Nancy, who, you know, is a well-meaning creature, but no conjurer, popt it all 
out.”  SENSE AND SENSIBILITY 258 (Oxford Univ. Press 1933) (1806). 
 17. Holmes was attacking the benefit-detriment approach when he put forth his version of 
bargain theory (“reciprocal conventional inducement”) in 1881, fully ten years before Hamer.  
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 230 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Bellknap 
Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881). 
 18. See I. Maurice Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 
136, 136 (1916) (“I will give you $100 if you walk across the Brooklyn Bridge.”). 
 19. Actually, since the opinion says that Willie “assented and fully performed,” see supra 
note 8 and accompanying text, maybe it’s a bilateral contract, though I don’t see how.  Could 
Uncle have collected damages if Willie had breached? 
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Actually, Hamer can work very well with the bargain theory if it is 
immediately followed by a case like Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Co.20  Baehr is 
not in every casebook, though it is in some, most notably Knapp, Crystal and 
Prince,21 and similar cases abound.  In Baehr the plaintiff owned several gas 
stations that he had leased to a man named Kemp who got behind on his 
accounts with his supplier.  The supplier, Penn-O-Tex, took an assignment of 
Kemp’s receivables and put an agent in to oversee his business.  Nobody made 
any rental payments to Mr. Baehr, though the supplier was receiving rent from 
Kemp’s sub-tenants.  According to Mr. Baehr, when he called up for his 
money, Penn-O-Tex’s agent told him that Kemp’s affairs “were in a very 
mixed up form but that he would get them straightened out and mail me [the 
plaintiff] my checks for the rent.”22  Baehr then wrote to Penn-O-Tex asking 
what he had to do to get his rent checks, and added “[o]r will I have to give it 
to an attorney to sue.”23  Penn-O-Tex wrote back that it was attempting to 
assist the tenant in keeping the business going but was in no way operating the 
station or taking possession of it, and denied knowledge of or responsibility for 
the rent.  A week or ten days after receiving the letter, Mr. Baehr called the 
agent and asked for the rent.  According to the court, “Defendant’s agent then 
said to plaintiff, ‘they (the company) were interested and that they would see 
that I (the plaintiff) got my rent, and would take care of it, and they would 
work it out with the head office . . . He said he would take it up with them and 
they would assure me my rent.’”24  Penn-O-Tex never paid, and after waiting 
several months, Mr. Baehr evicted the tenant and sued Penn-O-Tex for the 
back rent.  Penn-O-Tex denied ever making the assurance, but since a jury had 
found for Mr. Baehr the court accepted his version.  According to the court, 
Penn-O-Tex never asked Baehr to forebear collection in exchange for its 
promise to see that the back rent got paid.  On Baehr’s own version of the facts 
all Penn-O-Tex had said was  “that they would see that I . . . got my rent, and 
would take care of it,” and that was not a proposed exchange.25  Although 
Baehr argued that his forebearance was evidence of an agreement that he 
would forebear in exchange for the promise, the court found that his reason for 
waiting about four months was to avoid interrupting his winter vacation and 
thus for his own convenience rather than as consideration for Penn-O-Tex’s 
promise. 
 
 20. Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Co., 104 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 1960). 
 21. See CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, 
PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 103 (4th ed. 1999). 
 22. Baehr, 104 N.W.2d at 663. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 665-66.  The court also rejected other theories of recovery not based on contract, 
but did not explicitly deal with reliance. 
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Baehr reflects a rigid, and rather old-fashioned, view of bargain and 
exchange.  Surely many courts would find a bargain implicit in the words 
attributed to Penn-O-Tex, and that is a point worth making.  But to me, Baehr 
is most interesting as an illustration of a case that would be good under the 
benefit-detriment theory.  Thus, we can use Baehr, the bargain case, to 
illustrate benefit-detriment, and Hamer, the benefit-detriment case, to illustrate 
bargain.  Penn-O-Tex made a promise to Baehr: “We’ll see you get your rent.”  
It received a benefit in connection with this promise, even if not exactly in 
exchange for it: Baehr held off evicting the tenant.  On top of this, Baehr, the 
promisee, suffered an actual detriment in connection with the promise: he 
didn’t get his rent, as well as a legal detriment: he didn’t exercise his privilege 
to evict the tenant. 
All this works if I am correct in my assessment of the benefit-detriment 
theory, but I admit that based on Hamer, I cannot be sure what it really was—
or is, if New York really still follows it.26  Grant Gilmore described it in The 
Death of Contract (“The Death”) as a looser version of consideration than 
bargain, closer to the civil law’s causa,27 but Gilmore is notoriously casual 
about his history in The Death, and even though he seems right here, the book 
has to be used cautiously.28  Although Hamer is not a good example of benefit-
detriment, some of the cases and writers cited with approval by the New York 
Court of Appeals are, and they intrigue me because they would not work under 
the bargain theory.  In an English case cited, Shadwell v. Shadwell, the 
promisor wrote that he was so pleased at the promisee’s getting engaged that 
he would pay him £150 per year until his annual income as a chancery barrister 
reached six hundred guineas (£630). 29  This promise was held enforceable, the 
“benefit” being the uncle’s happy feeling.  The Court of Appeals also cited the 
twelfth edition of Kent’s Commentaries to the effect that “[a]ny damage, or 
 
 26. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 27. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 20-22 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., rev. ed. 
1995).  On causa, see supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 28. THE DEATH OF CONTRACT is a book that is underestimated by the sophisticated and 
overestimated by the unwashed.  For assessments of it, see Ronald K. L. Collins, Forward to the 
Rev. Ed., of GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 27, at vii-xxix; Symposium: 
RECONSIDERING GRANT GILMORE’S THE DEATH OF CONTRACT, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1-266 
(1995); and authorities cited in Collins’s most interesting contribution to the Northwestern 
Symposium, Ronald K. L. Collins, Gilmore’s Grant (or The Life & Afterlife of Grant Gilmore & 
His Death), 90 NW. U. L. REV. 7 (1995), reprinted in LINZER, CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, supra 
note 13, at 262.  In my view, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT is a great book, but a loaded (and 
quirky) pistol that can blow up in your face if you’re not careful. 
 29. Hamer, 27 N.E. at 257 (citing Shadwell v. Shadwell, 9 C.B.(N.S). 159 (1891)).  The 
General Term, in the decision below, 11 N.Y.S. 182 (1890), had distinguished Shadwell as 
possibly involving reliance, based on the nephew marrying and incurring expenses because of the 
uncle’s promise. 
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suspension, or forbearance of a right will be sufficient to sustain a promise.”30  
Since the promisee in Shadwell was not asked to do anything and Chancellor 
Kent makes no reference to the connection between the promise and the 
detriment, it is clear that neither of these authorities required explicit exchange, 
just a promise and a benefit or detriment related to it in some way.  There is no 
reason to get bogged down in the details of this largely superannuated theory, 
but if it is explained at least to this extent it can do two things: illustrate by 
contrast what the bargain theory is about (in Holmes’s words, reciprocal 
conventional inducement31), and raise the question whether bargain ought to be 
an essential element of consideration.32 
That question can be answered in a number of ways, but one of the best 
ways is to jump to a case usually found a little later in the book, at the start of 
promisory estoppel, The Allegheny College Case.33  That famous Cardozo 
opinion needs no detailed analysis by me; it has been discussed innumerable 
times, notably by Grant Gilmore in The Death,34 by Leon Lipson in an 
uproarious and widely reprinted essay that he wrote in the Yale Law Report,35 
and by Fred Konefsky in a line by line exegesis that is essentially a transcript 
of a legendary annual lecture in his contracts class at the State University of 
 
 30. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 465 (12th ed. 1873), cited in 
Hamer, 27 N.E. at 257. 
 31. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 32. It appears unclear just how closely related the detriment or benefit and the promise had 
to be; the cases and writers don’t seem to focus on the issue.  M. P. Furmston, author of the 
leading current English contracts text, writes that in the nineteenth century a plaintiff might 
establish consideration in either of two ways: “He might prove either that he had conferred a 
benefit upon the defendant in return for which defendant’s promise was given or that he himself 
had incurred a detriment for which the promise was to compensate.”  M. P. FURMSTON, 
CHESHIRE, FIFOOT AND FURMSTON’S THE LAW OF CONTRACT 69 (9th ed. 1985) (emphasis 
added).  In contrast to the authorities I discussed in the text, the Hamer court quoted others that 
seem to require reciprocity, though nothing is made of the difference in language.  The opinion 
quotes Anson on Contracts as saying, “It is enough that something is promised, done, forborne or 
suffered by the party to whom the promise is made as consideration for the promise made to 
him,” and Parsons on Contracts as “[i]n general a waiver of any legal right at the request of 
another party is a sufficient consideration for a promise.”  27 N.E. at 257 (emphasis added).  The 
words that I have italicized seem to show that a reciprocity requirement may in fact have been 
present in most versions of the benefit-detriment version of consideration, but if so, the 
reciprocity requirement seems to have been casually assumed rather than subjected to the nice 
distinctions of Baehr. 
 33. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173  (N.Y. 1927). 
 34. GILMORE,  supra note 27, at 68-70, 144-46, 165-66. 
 35. Leon Lipson, The Allegheny College Case, 23 YALE L. REP. 8 (1977).  Lipson’s piece is 
quoted or summarized in many casebooks.  Its most notable passage is reprinted in LINZER, 
CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, supra note 13, at 222-23, as part of the Fred Konefsky article cited in 
the next note. 
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New York at Buffalo.36  I am fond of all three discussions, but with the greatest 
respect for Gilmore and Lipson, Fred Konefsky’s piece steals the show.  I 
regularly assign it to be read by the students along with the case, like a score to 
a symphony. 
In brief, Mary Yates Johnston signed a pledge card in which she promised 
to pay $5000 to Allegheny College (“the College”) thirty days after her death 
“[i]n consideration of my interest in Christian Education, and in consideration 
of others subscribing . . . .”37  On the back of the card she wrote “[i]n loving 
memory this gift shall be known as the Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund,” 
the proceeds of which were to be used for the education of ministry students.  
She put a $5000 bequest to the College in her will, but before her death she 
removed it and paid the College $1000, which it may have placed in a special 
account, but did not use to name a fund after her.38  When the balance was not 
paid at the appropriate time after her death the College sued her executor.  On 
its face the transaction looks like a promise of a gift, a conditional one at that.  
Cardozo, however, found that it was an implied offer of a bilateral contract 
requiring the College to promise to establish the named fund, and that by 
accepting the $1000 the College impliedly bound itself to establish the fund 
when it received the balance, thereby accepting the offer—impliedly. 
Going through Cardozo’s factual convolutions is a valuable lesson for 
students—in Grant Gilmore’s words, “[s]ince Cardozo was one of the best case 
lawyers who ever lived, the proof was invariably marshaled with a masterly 
elegance,”39 some would say with the misdirection of a three-card monte 
pitchman on the New York City subway.40  In any event, with Fred Konefsky 
and an attentive classroom teacher, the students can learn a lot about fact 
management from The Allegheny College Case, especially if they are also 
exposed to Cardozo’s trompe l’oeil of ten years earlier, DeCicco v. 
Schweitzer.41 
 
 36. Alfred S. Konefsky, How To Read, Or at Least Not Misread, Cardozo in the Allegheny 
College Case, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 645 (1987), reprinted in LINZER, CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, 
supra note 13, at 219. 
 37. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 174. 
 38. On this factual point there is some dispute.  Cardozo says that “[t]he college set the 
money aside to be held as a scholarship fund for the benefit of students preparing for the 
ministry,” id., but Fred Konefsky quotes the brief for the executor (written by future Supreme 
Court Justice Robert H. Jackson), which states “that the fund has never been established for—
‘We could not establish the fund and have students coming expecting to receive from it until we 
had it.’”  Konefsky, supra note 36, at 697 (quoting the testimony of the college’s treasurer); 
LINZER, CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, supra note 13, at 235. 
 39. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 75 (1977). 
 40. Compare Lipson, supra note 35  (using the metaphor of a Thaumatrope, an eighteenth 
century precursor of the motion picture, which relied on optical illusion). 
 41. DeCicco v. Schweitzer, 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917).  In DeCicco a father promised an 
annuity after marriage to his daughter and her fiancé, an Italian count.  After some years the 
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But it trivializes Allegheny to turn it into a parlor trick.  In all likelihood 
the students will agree with the dissenting Judge Kellogg that not only is it 
nonsense to try to turn this promise of a gift with a condition attached into an 
offer of a contract, but that even if this characterization of the pledge could be 
supported, it would be nothing more than the offer of a unilateral contract that 
could not be accepted during Mrs. Johnston’s lifetime and thus had to lapse at 
her death.42  And they’re probably right.  But that’s not the reason to read 
Allegheny.  The reason to read it is Cardozo’s description, manipulation and 
ultimate modification of consideration doctrine itself. 
That is why I assign Fred Konefsky’s article.  He discusses Cardozo’s 
factual legerdemain extremely well, but his real contribution is to show in 
detail what Cardozo was doing to the doctrine of consideration.  The dicta in 
Cardozo’s opinion may have helped legitimize promisory estoppel, but 
Konefsky quite correctly makes clear that the College’s success in Allegheny is 
not based on estoppel.  Cardozo found consideration, but in a way that 
arguably changed its essence. 
Cardozo began his discussion with Hamer and the concept of detriment to 
the promisee  being enough, but suggested that “[s]o compendious a formula is 
little more than a half truth,”43 the other half of the truth apparently being 
Holmes’s requirement of reciprocity between the promisee’s detriment and the 
promisor’s motive for the promise.  But, says Cardozo, the motive requirement 
has been progressively weakened, and in addition, “there has grown up of 
recent days a doctrine that a substitute for consideration or an exception to its 
ordinary requirements can be found in what is styled ‘a promisory 
estoppel.’”44  As Konefsky correctly and perceptively teaches us, the italicized 
words show that Cardozo uses promisory estoppel primarily as evidence that 
the gap between the loose New York benefit-detriment rule and classical 
bargain theory was closing, especially when charitable subscriptions were 
involved.45 
 
father reneged and the couple sued through an assignee.  Cardozo found consideration in their not 
breaking off the engagement, saying with a straight face that this could be viewed as what the 
father wanted for his promise.  He stated: 
The situation, therefore, is the same in substance as if the promise had run to husband and 
wife alike, and had been intended to induce performance by both. They were free by 
common consent to terminate their engagement or to postpone the marriage. If they 
forebore from exercising that right and assumed the responsibilities of marriage in 
reliance on the defendant’s promise, he may not now retract it. 
Id.  Note Cardozo’s intertwining of bargain and reliance in the last sentence. 
 42. See Allegheny,  159 N.E. at 177 (Kellogg, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 174. 
 44. Id. at 175 (emphasis added). 
 45. Konefsky, supra note 36, at 66, reprinted in LINZER, CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, supra 
note 13, at 226-27. 
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This, to my mind, is why it is important to spend the time and effort 
teaching Allegheny.  Konefsky shows us that it is a critical opinion, not just a 
clever one.  Yes, it is written in that wonderfully stylized language that would 
be intolerable in anyone else.  Yes, Cardozo affects that pose of naïf who is 
making no changes in the law.  Yes, we can wonder what went on in that 
strange man’s mind, that monk of the law whose father had to resign from the 
bench in a judicial scandal, who never married, who lived with his sister all his 
life, who fascinates us sixty years after his death.  But the reason to teach The 
Allegheny College Case is that by reading it closely, with help from the 
instructor (and Fred Konefsky), students can learn how and why the concept of 
consideration changed in this century, can ask whether we should go back to a 
stricter view of bargain, and most of all, can be introduced to the real question: 
do we need consideration at all? 
Before turning to that bedrock question, though, it is useful to disabuse the 
students of the notion that Cardozo was some subversive who just didn’t care 
about rules of consideration.  We can start by asking those who think that of 
him why he didn’t just rely on Hamer to decide Allegheny.  Why did he say 
that the benefit-detriment rule was only a half-truth in terms of Holmes’s 
approach to bargain?  Why did he go to such lengths to find an implied 
reciprocal bargain over the naming of the fund?  And most of all, why did he 
write Dougherty v. Salt?46  
Dougherty is another case that I like because of its flavor.  Cardozo quotes 
the infant plaintiff’s guardian, who tells how the eight-year old Charles 
Napoleon Dougherty’s Aunt Tillie came to visit: 
When she saw Charley coming in, she said, “Isn’t he a nice boy?”  I answered 
her, Yes; that he is getting along very nice, and getting along nice in school; 
and I showed where he had progressed in school, having good reports, and so 
forth, and she told me that she was going to take care of that child; that she 
loved him very much.  I said, “I know you do, Tillie, but your taking care of 
the child will be done probably like your brother and sister done, take it out in 
talk.”  She said, “I don’t intend to take it out in talk; I would like to take care 
of him now.” I said, “Well, that is up to you.”  She said, “Why can’t I make 
out a note to him?” I said, “You can, if you wish to.” She said, “Would that be 
right?” And I said, “I do not know, but I guess it would; I do not know why it 
would not.” And she said, “Well, will you make out a note for me?”  I said, 
Yes, if you wish me to,” and she said, “Well, I wish you would.”   
A blank was then produced, filled out, and signed.  The aunt handed the note to 
her nephew, with these words: “You have always done for me, and I have 
signed this note for you.  Now, do not lose it.  Some day it will be valuable.”47 
 
 46. 125 N.E. 94 (N.Y. 1919). 
 47. Id. at 94-95. 
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Though the note read “For value received,” the New York Court of 
Appeals unanimously ruled against Little Charley, in an opinion by Cardozo.  
“The plaintiff through his own witness, has explained the genesis of the 
promise, and consideration has been disproved.”  The guardian gave Aunt 
Tillie very bad legal advice; any lawyer could have come up with half a dozen 
ways to make the gift enforceable.  And there is no indication that Aunt Tillie 
ever changed her mind.  And it appears that Little Charley needed the money.  
Why did Cardozo, who worked so hard to find a bargain in Allegheny, almost 
disdainfully dismiss Aunt Tillie’s inept but sincere promise, especially since 
the Appellate Division had held for Charley?  Was it because this was a family 
gift rather than an institutional one?  But he went to great lengths to find a 
bargain in DeCicco,48 involving a count, an heiress and her father’s promise of 
an annuity upon their marriage.  Why not here?  After all, Charley needed the 
promised money so much more and there was no indication that Aunt Tillie 
had ever changed her mind, as the promisors had in Allegheny and DeCicco. 
There are two answers that I can come up with.  First of all, there just 
weren’t the facts to work with.  Charley was a little boy who probably didn’t 
even understand Aunt Tillie’s promise, so it would have been very hard to find 
reliance sufficient to impose promisory estoppel.  And Aunt Tillie hadn’t put 
any conditions on the gift, not even Charley doing well in school or not 
dropping out, so Cardozo would have been hard pressed to weave his webs 
here.  But Aunt Tillie’s note said “for value received.”49  Couldn’t Cardozo 
have relied on the boilerplate language and held Tillie’s estate bound by it?  
That leads to my second answer.  Cardozo cared about consideration.  Cardozo 
was and is notorious for his indirection.  Consider in Torts how he expanded 
the notion of responsibility in Wagner v. International Railway’s “danger 
invites rescue”50 only to contract it with Palsgraf’s “the risk reasonably to be 
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed”,51 and how he eliminated the privity 
of contract requirement for products liability52 only to keep it for 
accountants.53  In Corbin’s famous words, after Cardozo has been to work, “the 
law is not exactly as it was before; but there has been no sudden shift or 
revolutionary change.”54  Clearly the same process is involved in the 
consideration cases.  Cardozo is quite willing to stretch the concept and 
 
 48. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 49. Dougherty, 125 N.E. at 94. 
 50. Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921) 
 51. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).  Some might find this not 
inconsistent with Wagner, but I think the point of view is less generous. 
 52. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,  111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 53. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). 
 54. Arthur L. Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and The Law of Contracts, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 
56, 57 (1939). 
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enforce many promises not clearly involving bargain, but he has his limits, and 
unfortunately for Little Charley, Aunt Tillie went beyond them. 
As a judge, Cardozo was not obliged to explain his limits or to put forth a 
coherent and comprehensive theory.  But many law professors have done so, 
and by this point the students have enough familiarity with the issue to benefit 
from some heavyweight thinking.  Law students aren’t used to reading a group 
of articles without any cases, but they can learn a lot from a one day debate 
among say, Lon Fuller, Farber and Matheson, Yorio and Thel, Chuck Knapp 
and  Mel Eisenberg.  Lon Fuller’s 1941 Columbia Law Review article, 
Consideration and Form,55 is excerpted in most casebooks, especially with 
respect to his explanation of the “evidentiary,” “cautionary” and “channeling” 
effects of consideration, but in a more complete transcription it functions as a 
good apology for a fairly traditional approach to consideration: necessary to 
protect private autonomy in those situations where we can be confident that 
private actors should be held to have bound themselves.  I assign it fairly early 
in the consideration portion of the course, but it can be recalled and 
interpolated among writers who virtually dismiss consideration, or at least 
think that it plays—and should play—much less of a role than Fuller assigned 
it. 
These writers, with varying political outlooks, have argued that because of 
the widespread use of reliance, moral obligation and other “substitutes,” 
consideration has become superfluous for all promises except perhaps gifts 
within the family.56  I like to juxtapose these writers, some (Farber and 
Matheson) relational, some (Yorio and Thel) autonomy based, one (Knapp) 
perhaps best described just as pragmatic.  If there were time, I would contrast 
Judge Richard Posner’s economic analysis of why we don’t enforce promises 
of gifts within the family57 with Mel Eisenberg’s very thoughtful and to me, 
rather convincing analysis of the same question.58  In an ideal world, I’d 
probably have the class read Allan Farnsworth’s new book on regret.59 
 
 55. 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941), excerpted in LINZER, CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, supra 
note 13, at 285. 
 56. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promisory Estoppel: Contract 
Law and the “Invisible Handshake”, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903 (1985) excerpted in LINZER, 
CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, supra note 13, at 361; Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promisory 
Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991), excerpted in LINZER, CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, 
supra note 13, at 377; Charles L. Knapp, The Promise of the Future—and Vice Versa: Some 
Reflections on the Metamorphosis of Contract Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. (1984).  For some short 
comments on the rationales put forth, see my notes in LINZER, CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, supra 
note 13, at 360-61 and 377. 
 57. Richard Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 411 
(1977), reprinted in LINZER, CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, supra note 13, at 296. 
 58. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1970). 
 59. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS 
(1998).  Of course, we don’t live in an ideal world, especially as Contracts is increasingly reduced 
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Students hate theorizing, but we aren’t in this business just to teach 
mechanics.  Prosser is supposed to have said that the trouble with law students 
is that they only want one thing—to become lawyers.  That depresses those of 
us who have gone into teaching because we are concerned with the questions 
of why the law is what it is and whether what it is is what it ought to be.60  I 
think that this is more than intellectual self-entertainment; it is our obligation 
to raise these questions with the students.  We have a duty to do all we can to 
induce them to think about questions beyond the mechanical, both to help them 
understand mechanical things more fully, and to prepare them to carry out their 
obligations as leaders of the society they serve. 
There has always been debate whether instructors should disclose their 
own position.  The professor as pitchman can be intimidating (and irritating) to 
students and close off their independent reasoning, but Olympian detachment 
by the teacher is frustrating (and equally irritating) and can leave students with 
a sense of cognitive dissonance—a million ideas floating about and nothing 
mooring them.  If teachers make clear that their opinions are available for 
potshots, that mindless parroting back is much less welcome than reasoned 
criticism, students sometimes will rise above the Gilberts and Nutshells and 
actually think.61  For these reasons, I think it makes sense to show my hand, 
and let the class know what I think. 
What I think is that consideration has a great deal to do with regret.  That 
is, the real question is when are we going to allow a promisor62 to renege, not 
for any functional reason like mistake or impossibility or the promisee’s 
breach, but just because the promisor has changed his mind.  The traditional 
analyses of consideration focused on mechanics: was there a detriment, was 
there a bargain?  This was consistent both with a medieval system heavy with 
form, and with the classical (that is, mid- to late-Victorian) pretense that the 
system was neutral and value-free.  But with all the substitutes that are allowed 
 
to four or five credits.  The instructor must figure how to expend the scarce resource of time.  I 
would argue that what they will learn justifies spending a day on theory and policy. 
 60. The less sympathetic would just say that we flunked out of practice and had to find work. 
 61. In Houston, Texas, where I teach, most of the grappling with bigger issues has come 
from the right: Federalist Societies, economic libertarians and Christian Legal Societies show that 
students will sometimes think beyond the bar exam.  I try to move the big picture back into the 
classroom with somewhat less of a partisan slant. 
 62. A related question, not exactly part of the consideration topic but really intertwined with 
it, is whether a promise is always needed.  The “contractual” obligation may arise from a 
relationship itself.  The writings of Ian Macneil are the major source here, though Macneil does 
not always approve of where his disciples (I am one) take his theories.  I explored this question in 
the context of employment at will in Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment As 
a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323 (1986).  A recent and 
excellent discussion in a quite different context can be found in John Wightman, Intimate 
Relationships, Relational Contract Theory, and the Reach of Contract, 8 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 
93 (2000). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1330 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1317 
today we should move away from form and ask instead whether this is the kind 
of promise where we want to allow regret alone to justify non-performance.  
Eisenberg makes a good case for regret in the family context generally, and as 
a privilege of consumers, particularly when the seller (who has promised to 
provide goods or services in exchange) has not really suffered any reliance 
damage from the consumer’s promise.63  Most of us feel the same way about a 
promise to meet a friend for dinner, even if he promised to do something in 
exchange.  The consumer’s right to renege was protected statutorily some forty 
years ago in the context of door-to-door sales.64  There is certainly 
consideration present in a door-to-door contract, but it is an area that has a 
great potential for hard-to-prove overreaching, and it is heavily dependent on 
pushing the householder into impulse buying without taking time for 
reflection. 
Harold Havighurst told us many years ago that most promises were 
performed, that most breach of contract litigations involved some extraneous 
factor like the promisor’s death or a change in management of a company.65  
Some but not all of the cases I have discussed in this paper fit that description: 
in Hamer and Dougherty there was nothing to indicate that the testator wanted 
to renege, but an executor had to try to frustrate the testator’s intent.  On the 
other hand, in The Allegheny College Case, Baehr and DeCicco the promisors 
did regret their promises66 and sought to renege.  Only one was successful, and 
that was the one with the least justifiable regret, the oil company in Baehr, 
which was in a business transaction and had made money on the arrangement.  
Yet it got out of its promise precisely because of the consideration doctrine.  
The most justifiable regret is said to be of promises within the family, yet the 
consideration doctrine led to enforcement in DeCicco when the father had 
changed his mind, and to invalidity in Dougherty where Aunt Tillie had not 
and apparently went to her grave wanting Little Charlie to get her $3000. 
All this suggests that the consideration doctrine doesn’t work very well.  
Both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code have decreed that some substantive types of promises will 
be enforced without consideration: charitable subscriptions for the 
Restatement67 and contract modifications for Article 2.68  I would expand the 
concept to a general one: a promise should be enforced if the promisor 
 
 63. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 794-
98 (1982). 
 64. 16 C.F.R. §§ 429.0-.2 (2000). 
 65. Harold C. Havighurst, The Nature of Private Contracts, in 1961 Rosenthal Lectures, 
Northwestern Univ. School of Law (Northwestern Univ. Press 1961). 
 66. I assume, arguendo, that Mr. Baehr’s story was true.  See supra notes 21-23 and 
accompanying text. 
 67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §90 (2) (1981). 
 68. See U.C.C. § 2- 209 (1). 
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expressed no regret during his lifetime, or if it is made in a non-family, non-
consumer context.  There undoubtedly need to be some refinements made, but 
that’s a beginning.  I would toss this out and invite student potshots.  As long 
as they realize that most if not all courts don’t buy what I say, and as long as 
they know what most courts do require in order to find a promise enforceable, 
they will understand consideration in terms both of what is involved today, and 
of what may be the issues tomorrow.  If I can get that much across, I’ll 
consider my time well spent. 
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